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ABSTRACT
Past studies argue that states abide by international human rights laws because the ratification of
human rights treaties elicits public demand for compliance. Yet, the extent to which human rights
treaties affect public support for compliance is unclear. At times, legalization of norms seems to
elicit substantial public support for compliance, but at other times, legalization seems to have little
effect. This study incorporates the life cycle of norms to arrive at a deeper understanding of the
conditions in which international legal commitments to human rights generate public support for
compliance with human rights norms. Using a series of survey experiments, this study finds that
the effect of legalization on public support depends on the internalization of the norm itself. When
a norm is emerging, legalization garners greater public support. When the norm is internalized,
legalization does not always generate greater public support. In a sense, state commitment and
norm internalization have substitutable effects on eliciting public support for compliance. This
study also uses text analysis to explore the causal mechanisms through which international law
causes greater public support for compliance. Laws of high obligation elicit public support by
generating concerns over the state’s reputation, regardless of the norm’s life cycle. These findings
suggest that policymakers and human rights advocates hoping to elicit greater public support for
compliance with human rights norms should invest their political capital and financial resources
on legalizing emerging norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can international law cause greater state compliance with
human rights norms in the absence of centralized enforcement? If so,
how? Due to the decentralized nature of international law, many have
asked why states comply with international law and whether
international legal commitments can lead to greater compliance with
human rights norms.1 Scholars have looked to domestic politics to
suggest several domestic compliance mechanisms. Some studies
suggest that human rights treaties empower domestic actors such as
the courts and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to ensure
greater compliance with human rights norms post-ratification.2 On the
other hand, some studies examine whether international human rights
treaties can shift public perception of human rights norms and thereby
pressure policymakers to comply through a constituency-driven
domestic compliance mechanism.3 The constituency-driven domestic
See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Robert Bork,
The Limits of “International Law”, 18 NAT’L INTEREST 3 (1989-90); Francis A. Boyle,
The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism between International Law and International
Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193 (1980); George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996); Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002);
Stanley Hoffman, The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities, 10 INT’L
ORG. 357 (1956); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review); Jana Von Stein, Do Treaties Constrain or Screen?
Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 (2005).
2
See, e.g., SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE (2007); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991); SIMMONS,
supra note 1; HEATHER SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERE COMMITMENTS (2012); Emilie
M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1373 (2005); Eric Neumayer, Do
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 925 (2005); Emilia J. Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton, Domestic Judicial Institutions
and Human Rights Treaty Violation, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149 (2009).
3
See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights
Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014)
[hereinafter Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights]; Xinyuan Dai, Why
Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005); Sarah Kreps
& Geoffrey Wallace, International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone
1
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compliance mechanism suggests that by affecting public opinion,
international law gives policymakers an incentive to comply with
international human rights law even without the traditional
mechanisms for compliance that domestic law enjoys. 4
To test the constituency-driven compliance mechanism,
several studies use survey experiments to examine whether the
existence of an international agreement shifts public support for
compliance with human rights norms.5 While some studies find that
the ratification of international law shifts public attitudes, 6 others do
not find that treaty ratification has a significant additive effect in
eliciting public demand for compliance.7 This study theorizes that the
Strikes, 53 J. PEACE RESEARCH 830 (2016); Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N. Shapiro,
International Law and Voter Preferences: the Case of Foreign Human Rights Violations, HUM.
RTS. REV. (2017); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes toward
Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013) [hereinafter Wallace,
International Law and Public Attitudes]; Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Martial Law? Military
Experience, International Law, and Support for Torture, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 501 (2014)
[hereinafter Wallace, Martial Law]; Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public
Opinion: An Experimental Study (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. Of Law and Econ
Research
Paper
No.
687,
2014),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2353&context
=law_and_economics [hereinafter Chilton, The Laws of War]; Michael Tomz,
Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs (Stanford University
Research Paper, 2008), https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw2008-02-11a.pdf; Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, The Reputational Consequences of International
Legal Commitments (Rutgers University Niehaus Center for Globalization and
Governance
Research
Paper,
2014),
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/filerepository/public/reputation_paper_princeton2015.pdf [hereinafter Wallace, The
Reputational Consequences].
4
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3, at
112–13.
5
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences,
supra note 3.
6
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note
3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3.
7
See, e.g., Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3 (finding that general appeals
to the morality of human rights norms elicit the same degree of public demand for
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life cycle of norms can account for the difference and uses survey
experiments in the United States and South Korea to test the theory
and arrive at a deeper understanding of when human rights treaties
generate public support for compliance with human rights norms.
The study’s findings can be summarized as follows. First, when
a human rights norm is emerging, strong international legal
commitments generate greater public support for compliance than
weak commitments. When a human rights norm is internalized,
stronger state commitments do not always generate greater public
support than weaker commitments. In a sense, state commitment and
norm internalization have substitutable effects on eliciting public
support for compliance. These findings have broader policy
implications in that, when a norm is emerging, human rights advocates
and policymakers may generate greater public support for compliance
by ratifying international human rights treaties of high obligation that
commit the state to observe the emerging norm, but they should
expect laws of low obligation to do little in eliciting greater public
support.
Second, the study finds cross-national differences between the
U.S. and South Korea that suggest the limits of the effects of
international law on public opinion in certain parts of the world. Unlike
the U.S., where legalization can inspire even greater support for
compliance with an internalized norm, in South Korea, stronger
international legal commitments are superfluous if the commitments
are merely codifying already recognized norms of state behavior. Such
cross-national differences highlight how different regions of the world
have varying conceptions of international law and human rights norms.
These differences should be taken into account before generalizing
past and future findings on international law and public opinion.
Third, the study uses text analysis to examine the causal
mechanisms through which international law elicits public support for
compliance with human rights norms as international legal commitments); Putnam
& Shapiro, supra note 3 (finding that general appeals to customary international
norms elicit greater public demand for compliance than ratification); Wallace,
International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3 (finding that the level of legal
commitment makes no difference in the degree of public distaste for torture).
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compliance in the U.S. The analysis reveals that laws of high obligation
elicit public support by staking the state’s reputation, regardless of the
norm’s level of internalization. These findings make evident for future
scholars the advantages of using innovative quantitative approaches to
analyze survey responses.
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
International treaties and interstate agreements comprise the
vast majority of international law, 8 but because states must first
consent to be bound by such treaties and agreements, international law
is often said to lack force.9 States can also opt to withdraw consent and
reverse legal commitments that they have made previously. 10 Skeptics
theorize that states sign international laws they are already predisposed
to follow, and international law is merely a reflection of state
preferences rather than a tool capable of changing state behavior.11 Put
differently, the legislative process or the process behind ratifying
international law suggests that international law merely has an
epiphenomenal effect.12
At the same time, the judicial process of international law is
also decentralized since states are their own judge and interpreter of
This study’s scope does not extend to customary international law. The
definition of international law can be broadened to include “customary international
law” or consistent patterns of state behaviour, but customary international law does
not bind states that persistently object to the custom. See Tomz, supra note 3.
9
See, e.g., RAYMOND ARON, PEACE WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 820 (1981) (“International law can merely ratify the fate of arms and the
arbitration of force.”); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 688 (6th ed. 1985) (states “are always anxious
to shake off the restraining influence that international law might have upon their
foreign policies, to use international law instead for the promotion of their national
interests”); Bork, supra note 1; Boyle, supra note 1; Downs et al., supra note 1;
Hoffman, supra note 1; Von Stein, supra note 1.
10
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–
82 (2005).
11
See, e.g., ARON, supra note 9, at 820; MORGENTHAU, supra note 9, 688;
Bork, supra note 1; Boyle, supra note 1; Downs et al., supra note 1; Hoffman, supra
note 1; Von Stein, supra note 1.
12
See Hoffman, supra note 1.
8
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international law. As long as states are sovereign, they can refuse to be
taken to court against their will. While international courts may help
adjudicate disputes at times, the fact remains that no state is forced to
appear before an international court. States that commit to compulsory
jurisdiction of international tribunals usually do so with the key
reservation that they retain the right to withdraw.13 Additionally, the
executive process of international law lacks force since there is no
world police monitoring and enforcing compliance with international
law. 14 Although there is an executive branch enforcing compliance
with domestic statutes, there is no centralized enforcement body that
is analogously tasked with the enforcement of international law.
Yet, even the most ardent skeptics recognize that international
law compliance is fairly widespread.15 As Louis Henkin once noted,
“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” 16 So why do
states comply with international law? Rationalists argue that mutual
gains from cooperation ensure self-enforcing compliance in the realm
of international trade law and the laws of war. 17 However, such a
mechanism does not adequately explain compliance with human rights
law. Just because one state does not comply with the stipulations of a
human rights treaty does not incentivize another state to renege on its
commitment to human rights in order to punish the noncompliant
state. There are no mutual gains to be shared or lost with human rights
treaties.

See Tomz, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the U.S. exercised such a
reservation at the International Court of Justice in the infamous Nicaragua case in
1984).
14
Id. at 4–5.
15
See Downs et al., supra note 1, at 380–81.
16
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47
(2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
17
See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1; JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER
WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN I NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION (2014);
Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENV. J. INTL’L L. &
POL’Y 471 (1989); Downs et al., supra note 1.
13

343

2019

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

7:2

A. Domestic Sources of Compliance
Scholars have focused on domestic sources of compliance.18
Professor Beth Simmons of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, who authored MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, argues that
signing a treaty explicitly guaranteeing a human rights norm changes
public perception of the human rights norm. 19 Segments of the
domestic constituency are subsequently motivated to secure their
newly promised right. 20 This shift in attitude among constituents
regarding the human rights norm incentivizes civil society to advocate
for and courts to ensure compliance with codified norm. 21 Others
explore the possibility of a constituency-driven domestic compliance
mechanism in which policymakers pay an electoral cost for reneging
post-ratification because treaties reshape public attitudes regarding
international human rights norms.22
Unfortunately, studies using survey experiments to test
whether international law causes respondents to support compliance
with human rights norms codified in international law have produced
mixed results. Some forms of international law for some norms appear
to foster greater public demand for compliance, 23 while others do not
CARDENAS, supra note 2; SCHACHTER, supra note 2; SIMMONS, supra note
1; SMITH-CANNOY, supra note 2; Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights,
supra note 3; Dai, supra note 3; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 2; Kreps &
Wallace, supra note 3; Neumayer, supra note 2; Powell & Staton, supra note 2; Putnam
& Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3;
Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra
note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3.
19
SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 80–81.
20
Id. at 135.
21
Id. at 129–30, 135.
22
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3; Dai,
supra note 3; Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace,
International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3;
Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational
Consequences, supra note 3.
23
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences,
supra note 3.
18
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seem to elicit an additional effect on public demand. 24 Given these
diverging findings, a better theory of when international legal
commitments affect public perceptions is warranted, especially
considering how courts, activists, and elected officials all rely on some
public support in order to ensure greater compliance with human
rights norms.25
B. The Puzzle
Some studies examining the effect of international human
rights law in shifting public opinion show that a high level of legal
commitment to a human rights norm—in the form of an international
human rights treaty—is superfluous in shifting public opinion. 26 A
general appeal to morality,27 a mere mention of existing human rights
standards, 28 or a weak state commitment to abide by human rights
standards 29 have the same effect in shifting public opinion as an
international law of high obligation that commits a state to observing
said human rights norms. To elaborate further, Professor Adam
Chilton of the University of Chicago Law School argues in his work
The Laws of War that general appeals to the norm against airstrikes that
result in the loss of civilian life elicit similar shifts in public opinion as
an international law that commits the state to refrain from such
airstrikes. 30 In another study, varying levels of commitment by a
foreign state to an international human rights norm against forced
labor do not alter public perceptions of the state.31 Meanwhile, laws of
high and low obligation to international norms against torture do not
cause significant differences in public distaste for torture. 32 In sum,
See, e.g., Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note
3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3.
25
See generally James Ron, Introduction to Special Issue on “Public Opinion Polling
and Human Rights”, 16 J. HUM. RTS. 257 (2017).
26
See generally Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra
note 3; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3.
27
See Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 7–8.
28
See Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 14.
29
See Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 127–28.
30
Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 3.
31
Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 10–11.
32
Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 127–28.
24
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according to these studies, laws of high obligation that commit states
to abide by human rights norms are largely redundant in influencing
public opinion and therefore unnecessary to induce state compliance
from the “bottom-up.”33
Consequently, these studies challenge the common
presumption that binding measures are more effective than
nonbinding measures.34 Although there is some scholarship that claims
that weak legal commitments can be as influential as strong
commitments, 35 the aforementioned studies undercut the broader
literature on legal obligation that stresses the level of state
commitment. 36 The broader literature outlines three dimensions of
legalization: obligation, precision, and delegation. 37 Obligation, the
focus of this study, is the degree to which states are bound by or
committed to a particular international law.38 Simply put, while some
laws are “‘hard law[s]’” that use the language of “‘[m]ust,’” other “‘soft
law[s]’” use the language of “‘should.’”39 Laws of low obligations (i.e.
soft laws) entail a weaker commitment, and laws of high obligations
(i.e. hard laws) are usually codified in concrete terms and entail a strong
commitment.40 Differences in obligation are expected to have varying
Id. at 106.
Chilton, The Laws of War, supra note 3, at 18; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note
3, at 15–16; Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3, at 135.
35
See generally DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE
ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2000)
(finding that non-binding norms can lead to state compliance).
36
See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); SHELTON, supra note 35; Kenneth W. Abbott
et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 17 (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 426 (2000).
Cf. Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L
ORG. 761 (2001) (finding that international institutions are rationally designed to vary
in five key dimensions such as control and flexibility, which are similar to the level
of state commitment).
37
Abbott et al., supra note 36, at 17.
38
Id.
39
Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
273, 274 (2010) (quoting Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft
Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 119–43
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., American Society of International Law 1997)).
40
See Simmons, supra note 39.
33
34
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effects in altering public opinion.41 However, the above studies suggest
that legal obligation does not differentially affect public support for
compliance.
On the other hand, different studies find that the level of
obligation does have a differential effect on public opinion. These
studies find that only strong levels of state commitment to abide by
human rights norms can elicit public support for compliance and that
weaker commitments cannot elicit similar public support for
compliance.42 For instance, one study finds that the public is swayed
towards compliance by an explicit ratification of a human rights treaty
concerning the solitary confinement of prisoners but is not similarly
swayed by general appeals to the same human rights norm.43 Another
study on treaty noncompliance and future cooperation arrives at a
similar conclusion regarding the divergent effects of strong and weak
legal commitments to human rights.44 These results are in accord with
the broader scholarship that stresses the limitations of nonbinding
legal commitments and argues for the importance of laws that entail a
high level of obligation.45
What is clear from the diverging findings is that state
commitments to human rights may not have a singular effect on public
support for compliance. There needs to be a more developed theory
of when international legal commitments lead to greater compliance
with human rights norms and when international legal commitments
are unnecessary. When does the level of commitment matter in shifting
public support for compliance? If nonbinding legal commitments have
the same effect as binding international law in shifting public support,
does it matter that states ratify treaties entailing a strong legal
commitment as opposed to a weak legal commitment? If only certain
Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, at 13–15.
See generally Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3; Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3; Wallace, International
Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3; Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3; Chilton, The
Laws of War, supra note 3; Tomz, supra note 3; Wallace, The Reputational Consequences,
supra note 3.
43
Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3, at 133.
44
Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, at 20.
45 See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 36, at 211–13; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 36,
at 422–26.
41
42
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norms require binding commitments to generate public support for
compliance, which ones, and why? Identifying which human rights
norms require strong legal commitments has far reaching policy
implications as well. Understanding when strong commitments shift
public support for compliance can help focus the limited political
capital and financial resources of policymakers and human rights
advocates hoping to elicit greater public support through the
ratification of international human rights treaties. This study turns to
norm internalization to develop and empirically test a theory of when
the public supports compliance with international human rights laws
and thereby provides better insight into state compliance with human
rights norms.
C. Norm Internalization
Norms are shared ideas and expectations about the appropriate
behavior for actors—what actors ought to do.46 The focus of this study
is a particular subset of norms, namely international human rights
norms, or ideas and expectations about the appropriate behavior for
states in relation to their human rights practices. There are numerous
examples of prominent international human rights norms such as nonrefoulement, the practice that forbids states from returning asylum
seekers to their country of origin where they will then face
persecution.47 Because non-refoulement is a prominent, well-established
norm, its non-derogable nature is relatively clear. 48 However, wellestablished norms “do not appear out of thin air” but are developed
by norm entrepreneurs through a maturation process that transforms
new ideas about how states should behave into universally recognized
norms.49
Accordingly, Professors Martha Finnemore of George
Washington University and Kathryn Sikkink of the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government, who co-authored International Norm Dynamics
46
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 892 (1998).
47
See generally Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 533 (2001).
48
Id. at 538–41.
49
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 46, at 896.
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and Political Change, outline a “life cycle” for norms: emergence, cascade,
internalization. 50 During norm emergence, what a particular norm
entails is unclear, and norm entrepreneurs attempt to better define the
norm and persuade a critical mass of actors to accept the emerging
norm.51 Persuaded actors then build towards a “tipping point,” which
results in a cascade of states willing to join the new normative regime
that carries with it clear ramifications.52 Finally, norm internalization
occurs after the cascade, at which point the norm is taken for granted
and its meaning is no longer subject to debate.53 When the cascade is
complete, the norm is said to have become internalized or
established.54 Similarly, in legal scholarship, Professor Harold Koh of
Yale Law School, who authored How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, describes norm internalization as a process in which norms
become a part of the state’s internal value system.55
D. The Theory
In light of the literature on norm internalization, this study
argues that taking account of norm internalization can help address
when international legal commitments elicit public demand for
compliance. Past legal scholarship has alluded to the need to take
seriously norm internalization as well. 56 Koh suggests that
legalization—what he terms the “horizontal” or “international legal
process” between states—only provides a partial picture. 57 Norm
internalization—what he terms the “vertical” or “transnational legal
process” within states—is equally important in explaining
compliance.58 To elicit compliance, a norm must become internalized
through “vertical domestication” such that actors come to recognize

Id. at 892, 894–95, 906.
Id. at 895–96.
52
Id. at 892.
53
Id. at 895.
54
Id. at 904.
55
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400–01 (1999).
56
Id. at 1403.
57
Id. at 1401, 1409.
58
Id.
50
51
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the norm as appropriate state behavior. 59 Taking into consideration
Koh’s conjecture, this study theorizes that internalized norms—norms
that have gone through “vertical domestication”—do not require legal
regimes to elicit compliance but that emerging norms require
legalization—the “horizontal legal process”—for full compliance.
To elaborate, this study contends that the extent to which
varying levels of legal commitment generate public support for
compliance with a human rights norm depends on the life cycle of the
particular human rights norm. Established human rights norms,
because they have been internalized by the people, do not need
stronger legal commitments to generate public support for
compliance, but emerging human rights norms benefit from strong
state commitments in eliciting public support for compliance because
the public otherwise may not demand compliance with emerging
norms. Stronger legal commitments should increase the likelihood of
compliance for emerging norms. In other words, established human
rights that have passed Finnemore and Sikkink’s “tipping point”60 or
have completed Koh’s “vertical” legal process 61 will not necessarily
benefit from high obligation, but norms that have not done so should
benefit from strong state commitments. The strength of a state’s legal
commitment to a human rights norm and the life cycle of that norm
should have substitutable effects in fostering public support for
compliance. The divergent findings in the domestic compliance
mechanism literature should be due to the fact that certain norms are
not well-established, requiring laws of high obligation to elicit public
support, but other human rights norms are well-established such that
laws of high obligation are unnecessary.
Before continuing further, the scope of this study’s theory
should be clarified. It is theoretically possible that legalization or strong
legal commitments may lead to greater norm internalization. That is, a
multitude of states making strong legal commitments to observe a
norm can lead to a norm cascade through which the meaning of the
norm is crystallized and is generally accepted as good practice. At the
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 625–26 (1998).
60
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 46, at 892–93.
61
Koh, supra note 55, at 1406.
59
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same time, it is possible that internalization also leads to legalization.
In that sense, these two concepts could be serially causal. The causal
relationship between legalization and internalization offer promising
paths for future research, but the focus of this study is to understand
the conditional effects of internalization and legalization on public
support for compliance.
Given this paper’s theory, this study empirically tests whether
emerging human right norms that are not yet internalized benefit from
laws of high obligation in generating public support for compliance,
more so than norms that are internalized. In doing so, this study’s
theory and empirics seek to better inform resource-constrained
policymakers and human rights activists whether to concentrate their
resources on legalizing norms that are emerging rather than norms that
are internalized.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
A. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
In order to test whether the life cycle of norms and the level of
state commitment conditionally elicit public support for human rights
norms, this study uses an original survey experiment. In the
experiment, a single human rights norm was framed as an emerging
norm or an internalized norm depending on the treatment assignment.
Experimentally manipulating the life cycle of the norm as emerging or
internalized across treatment conditions by framing the norm as such,
differences in the responses could be attributed to the level of norm
internalization. The key was ensuring that respondents did not reject
the treatment and instead accepted the life cycle of the norm as
indicated in the treatment condition. That is, it was imperative that if
the treatment said a particular norm was emerging, respondents treated
the norm as in fact emerging, and that if the treatment said a particular
norm was internalized, respondents treated the norm as internalized.
To meet such expectations, the experiment used the responsibility to
protect (R2P) as the human rights norm to be tested because R2P is
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commonly perceived to be at the edge of its tipping point and could
be justifiably framed as either emerging or internalized. 62
On one hand, R2P could be considered an internalized human
rights norm; in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the concept of R2P to help
justify humanitarian interventions in the wake of the genocides in
Rwanda and Srebrenica.63 The driving motif of R2P, as put forth by
the ICISS, was “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass
murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling
or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of states.”64 The norm gained traction in March 2005 when
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report entitled In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,
which highlighted the collective responsibility to protect.65 In 2005, at
the UN World Summit, over 170 heads of state unanimously adopted
the outcome of the General Assembly Resolution 60/1 recognizing
the responsibility of individual states to protect its population from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
and the responsibility of the international community to step in when
necessary.66 Together, they recognized the need to respond to mass
atrocities such as genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing but not to step in and respond to more general human
rights violations.67 Regarded as the crowning achievement of the 2005
UN World Summit, R2P could be considered one of the organizing

Text analysis of open ended responses suggest that respondents did in
fact accept their treatment conditions.
63
GARETH EVANS ET AL., INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE
SOVEREIGNTY,
THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT
11
(2001),
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
64
Id. at viii.
65
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, 5, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3 (May 26, 2005).
66
G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138 (Oct. 24, 2005).
67
Id. ¶ 139.
62
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principles for peace and security in the UN system and thus a wellestablished, internalized human rights norm.68
However, on the other hand, none of the aforementioned
international agreements can be regarded as a binding international
law, as defined by Article 38 of the 1946 Statute of the International
Court of Justice.69 The following discussion on the ambiguities in the
documents suggests continuing disagreements about what R2P entails,
indicating that R2P has yet to reach a norm cascade. In brief, not only
is it an open question as to how effective Resolution 60/1 will be in
preventing mass atrocities, but it is also unclear whether states will be
compelled to act on the grounds of R2P.70 Contrasting conceptions of
R2P enjoy support from varying segments of the international order,
and its meaning as a normative concept could be considered to still be
in flux.71 To elaborate, Resolution 60/1 does not specify the means
through which states are to exercise their responsibility. 72
Humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, and military
engagement are all possible.73 While many assume R2P justifies and
calls for military intervention, in 2005, then U.S. Ambassador to the
UN John Bolton stated that the U.S. considers R2P a “moral
responsibility” of the international community to “use appropriate
diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to
help protect populations” rather than military means. 74 Second, the
criterion that is supposed to trigger a foreign intervention, which is
defined simply as when the state is “manifestly failing” to protect its
citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
68
Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 100–01 (2007).
69
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946, 3
U.S.T. 1153.
70
See Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders, 12 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 32 (2012).
71
Stahn, supra note 68, at 102.
72
G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶¶ 138–139.
73
Stahn, supra note 68, at 104.
74
Id. at 108 (citing Letter from Ambassador Bolton to UN Member States
Conveying U.S. Amendments to the Draft Outcome Document Being Prepared for
the High Level Event on Responsibility to Protect, at 2 (Aug. 30, 2005),
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].p
df).
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against humanity, is not specified further. 75 Third, the UN Security
Council is the only body explicitly permitted to authorize intervention,
and the Resolution does not make clear whether the General
Assembly, regional organizations, or a coalition of states could act if
the Security Council failed to act. 76 Fourth, whether R2P as a
“responsibility” signifies a positive duty to act is unclear. Resolution
60/1 indicates that states will be “prepared to take collective action . . .
on a case-by-case basis,” which cautiously phrases the unwillingness of
UN member states to commit to a positive duty to act in light of mass
atrocities. 77 Former Associate Legal Officer of the International
Criminal Court Carsten Stahn writes,
The concept of responsibility to protect may gradually replace
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the course of the twentyfirst century. However, at present, many of the propositions of this
concept remain uncertain from a normative point of view or lack
support. Responsibility to protect is thus in many ways still a political
catchword rather than a legal norm. Further fine-tuning and
commitment by states will be required for it to develop into an
organizing principle for international society.78
Thus, skeptics of R2P may argue that the human rights norm
is still emerging and has yet to reach its tipping point. According to
such views, the ambiguities and varying interpretations of Resolution
60/1 reflect the ongoing struggle to reach a norm cascade.
Overall, Stahn perhaps best summarizes the debatable state of
R2P’s life cycle by writing that “[s]ome of the features of the concept
(R2P) are actually well embedded in contemporary international law,
while others are so innovative that it may be premature to speak of a
crystallizing practice.” 79 Thus, by taking advantage of the uncertain
state of R2P’s internalization, the study tests whether experimentally
varying levels of commitment to two different frames of R2P (i.e.,
framing R2P as an emerging norm or R2P as an internalized norm)
75
76
77
78
79

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶ 139; see also Stahn, supra note 68, at 117.
Stahn, supra note 68, at 109, 117–18, 120.
G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 66, ¶ 139.
Stahn, supra note 68, at 120.
Id. at 110.

354

2019

Legalization and Norm Internalization: An Empirical Study

7:2

results in significant differences in domestic support to abide by R2P,
without risking treatment rejection.
B. Survey Design
In terms of actual survey design, all respondents first read a
hypothetical about an armed group attacking civilians. Respondents
were then randomly assigned to one of five treatments conditions (i.e.,
a 2 x 2 design with a control treatment): a control treatment of no
information, a hard law internalized norm treatment condition, hard
law emerging norm treatment condition, soft law internalized norm
treatment condition, and a soft law emerging norm treatment
condition. All respondents were then asked to state their level of
support for compliance with R2P. The exact survey text was as follows.
According to reports by U.S. intelligence officers and
independent investigative reporters, we now have
conclusive evidence that an armed group is attacking
civilians in several Southeast Asian countries. This
armed group has ties to radical separatists in Indonesia.
[Control treatment: No information]
[Hard law and internalized norm treatment:] The
United States previously signed an international treaty
in which the U.S. made a commitment to protect
civilians from such attacks under a well-established
idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
According to this well-established idea, the
international community has a responsibility to take
measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed
groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that
include the use of force.
[Hard law emerging norm treatment]: The United
States has previously signed an international treaty in
which the U.S. made a commitment to protect civilians
from such attacks under a new idea called the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new
idea, some claim that the international community has
355
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a responsibility to take measures to protect civilians
and pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass
atrocities, measures that include the use of force.
[Soft law internalized norm treatment:] The United
States previously participated in a regional meeting that
suggested general guidelines to protect civilians from
such attacks under a well-established idea called the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this wellestablished idea, the international community has a
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and
pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass
atrocities, measures that include the use of force.
[Soft law emerging norm treatment:] The United States
previously participated in a regional meeting that
suggested general guidelines to protect civilians from
such attacks under a new idea called the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea, some
claim that the international community has a
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and
pursue violent armed groups in instances of mass
atrocities, measures that include the use of force.
Pursuing the armed group would result in U.S. military
involvement in Southeast Asia and pose another
significant cost to the national budget. Considering the
circumstances, do you approve or disapprove of the
U.S. taking military measures to go after the armed
group?
Strongly approve
Approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
356
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Disapprove
Strongly disapprove
The control treatment of no information left ambiguous the
existence of the norm and international law. In that sense, the
treatment did not represent a strict “no commitment” treatment. This
study nonetheless used such a control treatment in light of existing
studies that rely on equivalent control conditions of no information to
attain a baseline measure for comparisons with the four active
treatment conditions.80
C. Hypotheses
On the one hand, if the surveys revealed that a strong or weak
state commitment to R2P resulted in similar shifts in public support
for compliance, regardless of whether R2P was framed as emerging or
internalized, then the result would challenge the scholarly emphasis
placed on obligation. On the other hand, if varying levels of
commitment to an emerging norm resulted in varying levels of public
support but did not result in varying levels of support for an
established norm, then the results would further validate the scholarly
emphasis placed on obligation. Such a result would simultaneously
demonstrate the power of international human rights treaties to
generate public support for compliance when the norm is less
established. Based on this study’s theoretical conjectures, the
experiment tested the following hypotheses concerning potential
differences between each active treatment and the control treatment.
H1: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a high
level of obligation to R2P will result in higher public
support for compliance with R2P than no information.

80
See generally Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3;
Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3. An alternative research
design would have been specifying that such a norm did not exist or explicitly
mention the absence of any international law. This alternative design would have
result in an unrealistic level of deception given the state of R2P. The no information
treatment instead offered the most reasonable alternative.
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H2: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a low
level of obligation to R2P will not result in higher
public support for compliance with R2P than no
information.
H3: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a
high level of obligation to R2P will result in higher
public support for compliance with R2P than no
information.
H4: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a
low level of obligation to R2P will result in higher
public support for compliance with R2P than no
information.
The above comparisons are susceptible to a multiple testing
problem because each active treatment condition varied two key
variables relative to the control treatment (i.e., obligation and
internalization). To allay this multiple testing concern, the study also
tested two additional hypotheses in regards to differences in public
support after conditioning on the level of norm internationalization.
The two hypotheses thus contrasted pairs of active treatments, rather
than contrasting each active treatment against the control treatment.
Figure 1 helps paint a picture of the hypothesized strength of public
support for compliance among the active treatment conditions.
H5: When R2P is framed as an emerging norm, a high
level of obligation to R2P will result in higher public
support for compliance with R2P than a low level of
obligation.
H6: When R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a
high level of obligation to R2P will not result in higher
public support for compliance with R2P than a low
level of obligation.
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Public Support for Compliance

The survey also collected relevant demographic characteristics
for later analysis. These included standard demographics used in public
opinion scholarship, such as age, gender, education level, income, and
race.81 Other characteristics, also drawn from existing studies, included
various predispositions such as the respondents’ levels of cooperative
internationalism, militant internationalism, and isolationism. 82 In
See, e.g., Joshua D. Kertzer et al., Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape
Foreign Policy Attitudes, 76 J. POL. 825, 18 (2014); Wallace, International Law and Public
Attitudes, supra note 3, at 123.
82
See Kertzer, supra note 81, at 18.
81
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addition, the survey measured respondents’ political ideology,
knowledge level, employment status, and political activism. However,
due to the randomization of the treatment assignment, statistical
models involving covariates are not necessary for estimating unbiased
treatment effects.83 As such, the main models in the following analyses
do not include the covariates, and models controlling for covariates are
included only as robustness checks in the Appendix.
D. Comparative Country Case Selection
The study tested whether varying commitments to two
separate frames of R2P resulted in differences in public support for
compliance in both the U.S. and South Korea. Past studies focusing
exclusively on American public opinion, and some scholars have
voiced concerns that this tendency has resulted in an “Americaspecific” understanding of public opinion and international relations.84
The following discussion makes evident that this concern is especially
pronounced in public opinion research on international law given how
the U.S. occupies an idiosyncratic role in the international legal order.
First of all, no other state in the world promotes civil liberties as
robustly as the U.S. does, yet the U.S. has a uniquely strong aversion
to international laws guaranteeing essentially the same civil liberties. 85
For example, despite strong domestic statutes guaranteeing the rights
of children in the U.S., the U.S. has yet to ratify the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which guarantees essentially the same rights and
has been ratified by every state in the UN with the exception of only
two states: the U.S. and Somalia.86
It is easy to see why many of the reasons behind America’s
disinclination for ratifying international law could in turn cause the
See, e.g., Diana C. Mutz & Robin Pemantle, Standards for Experimental
Research: Encouraging a Better Understanding of Experimental Methods, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL
POL. SCI. 192 (2015); Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes, supra note 3.
84
See Jonathan Renshon et al., Democratic Leaders, Crises and War: Paired
Experiments on the Israeli Knesset and Public (Research Paper, 2016), 9,
https://people.fas.harvard.edu/~jkertzer/Research_files/DemocraciesWarCriseswebsite.pdf.
85
See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE PARADOX OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
POLICY 147–48 (2005).
86
Id. at 148.
83
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American public to react to ratified international law in a unique way
that does not reflect how the rest of the world reacts to international
law. To elaborate, Professor Andrew Moravcsik of Princeton
University, who authored THE PARADOX OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
POLICY, argues that the U.S. is skeptical of ratifying international
human rights treaties because it is geopolitically powerful. 87 Simply put,
Moravcsik’s claim is that a state is less likely to support multilateral
institutions such as human rights treaties if it possesses strong
unilateral bargaining power. 88 Furthermore, the U.S. also has a
decentralized political system that allows small veto groups such as
conservative political elites to derail the ratification process.89 These
factors that contribute to the U.S.’s strong aversion to ratifying
international human rights law may lead to unique public reactions
regarding compliance with international human rights norms postratification. The American public may react in an atypical manner
because they are fully aware that their own state is the most powerful
state in the world and because a strong contingent of political elites
regularly complicates the ratification of international law. For instance,
the fact that an international human rights treaty has been ratified may
cause Americans to support compliance more so than citizens of other
countries because Americans may assume that the particular human
rights norm is extraordinarily important to have successfully passed
such a high bar for ratification in the U.S. Americans may believe that
human rights norms that are sufficiently important to be codified into
international law should be complied with. If so, generalizing the
findings from a survey of Americans to other states with a lower bar
for treaty ratification would be premature. This study’s use of another
state thus allows for more generalizable insights into the effect of
international human rights law on public opinion.
In many ways, South Korea serves as an ideal contrast to the
U.S. for these purposes. First, South Korea does not share the same
geopolitical dominance as the U.S. South Korea is arguably not even a
dominant regional power, and so it does not have the unilateral
bargaining power that allows states such as the U.S. to forego

87
88
89

Id. at 167–68.
Id.
Id. at 186–88.
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multilateral agreements. Unsurprisingly, South Korea has ratified more
international human rights treaties than the U.S. has ratified. 90 The
relatively lower bar for ratification in South Korea allows this study to
test whether the sheer frequency of human rights treaties dilutes the
impact of international human rights law in eliciting strong public
support for compliance.
Furthermore, although East Asian states generally ratify
numerous international human rights treaties, these treaties appear to
hold little weight among the political elite who have refused to uphold
“Western-style” human rights by citing the need for economic
development and social harmony. 91 East Asian states often view
human rights treaties as Western conceptions of human rights that
require adjustments in both shape and content to become more
congruent with existing values and beliefs.92 Some have argued that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN documents are
treated as “dead letters” in East Asia, despite having been ratified by
the requisite number of countries both in and outside of Asia. 93
Therefore, South Korea provides an apt comparison to study the
applicability of the domestic compliance mechanism in a region where
international human rights law stands on questionable legitimacy.
Similar results in South Korea and the U.S. would increase confidence
in this study’s overall findings, but differences between the two
countries would highlight the need for future scholars to conduct
studies outside the U.S. in order to develop a more accurate
understanding of international law and public opinion.

Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. COMM’N H.R.,
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
91
See JOANNE R. BAUER & DANIEL A. BELL, THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1999).
92
See SALLY E. MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE:
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 1957 (2006); Amitav
Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 245 (2004).
93
See WALTER LAQUEUR & BARRY RUBIN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER
195 (1990).
90
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E. Sample Demographics
The two surveys involved a total of 1,098 American citizens
and 1,000 South Korean citizens. 94 Amazon Mechanical Turk
(hereinafter MTurk) hosted the survey of Americans on October 22
and 23, 2016, and the South Korean professional polling firm
Macromill Embrain hosted the survey of South Koreans from
November 16 to 22, 2016. Generally, American MTurk samples are
not representative and tend to over-represent younger, liberal, lower
income individuals while under-representing Hispanics and African
Americans. 95 The U.S. sample used in this survey over-represents
younger individuals and liberals as well. Fortunately, studies on MTurk
for the most part replicate studies that use nationally representative
samples. 96 On the other hand, the South Korean polling firm
Macromill Embrain administered the Korean-language version of the
survey to a nationally representative sample in South Korea. 97
IV. RESULTS
Do the degrees of legal obligation and the norm’s life cycle
affect whether the public will support compliance with R2P? The
following figure and table summarize findings from the U.S. and South
Korean surveys using ordinary least squares (OLS) models, which are
the typical linear regression models used for empirical research.98 The
three treatment conditions that were hypothesized to have a
statistically significant effect compared to the control treatment did
have a statistically significant effect. A high level of commitment to an
internalized norm, a low level of commitment to an internalized norm,
94

samples.

The tables in the Appendix provide further information regarding the

95
See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental
Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 357–59 (2012).
96
Id. at 352.
97
For South Koreans, the survey text was translated to reflect the general
tone and wording of the English version of the survey to the greatest extent possible.
The Appendix provides the exact text for the U.S. survey and the South Korean
survey.
98
See e.g., ALAN AGRESTI, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES
262 (2018).
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and a high level of commitment to an emerging norm all resulted in
statistically significant increases in public support for compliance
compared to the control treatment of no information. Meanwhile, a
low level of commitment to an emerging norm did not result in a
significant increase in public support for compliance.99
Figure 2: Average Treatment Effects

Table 1: U.S. and South Korea Survey Results (OLS)

Proportional odds models often used for Likert scale responses resulted
in the same findings for these models and all subsequent models. All of the models
have been reproduced in the Appendix.
99
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To test the fifth and sixth hypotheses, the study next used an
OLS model after dropping the control condition to compare responses
among the active treatments. As the following figure and table show,
when the norm is emerging, a high level of obligation resulted in a
statistically significant increase in public support for compliance in
both the U.S. and South Korea. These results suggest that when a
norm is emerging, a high level of obligation, as opposed to a low level
of obligation, will result in a statistically significant increase in public
support for compliance with the norm. Meanwhile, the study also finds
that a high level of obligation to an internalized norm does not always
result in stronger public support for compliance with R2P than a low
a level of obligation. For U.S. respondents, the level of obligation
makes a difference by generating greater public support, even when
the norm is already internalized, but it does not for South Korean
respondents. Therefore, the study finds support for the fifth
hypothesis and some support for the sixth hypothesis.
Figure 3: Marginal Treatment Effects of Higher Obligation
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Table 2: Marginal Treatment Effects of Higher Obligation (OLS)

V. DISCUSSION
When conditioning on an emerging norm, the level of
obligation is significant in shifting public support for compliance in the
U.S. and in South Korea. Human rights advocates and policymakers
thus have an incentive to make stronger legal commitments to
emerging norms in both states. However, when conditioning on an
internalized norm, the level of obligation causes a statistically
significant increase in public support for compliance only in the U.S.,
not in South Korea. Given that stronger legal commitments fail to
create additional public support for compliance in South Korea, South
Korean policymakers have little incentive to make stronger legal
commitments, as opposed to weak commitments, to internalized
norms for the purposes of eliciting increased public support. American
policymakers, however, do have an incentive to legalize internalized
norms as stronger legal commitments will engender even greater public
support for compliance in the U.S.
The results seem to suggest that South Koreans are more
preoccupied with the level of norm internalization and are less legalistic
in their approach to compliance. Their concern may be with
international normative traditions and not necessarily with whether
their state has made a strong legal commitment. Meanwhile, the U.S.
seems to be more legalistic in their approach to compliance, yielding
stronger public support for compliance even when the norm is wellestablished. These conjectures are in accordance with common
presumptions about the more legalistic approach the U.S. takes to
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international law as well the challenges international law still faces in
East Asia, as noted above. Unfortunately, it is not possible, given the
experimental design, to test the above conjectures or a variety of other
contextual circumstances that could be driving the cross-national
differences. At the very least, this study’s findings illustrate the need to
venture beyond the U.S. when studying public opinion and the need
to adopt a multi-state approach to legal scholarship on international
law.
VI. CAUSAL MECHANISMS
By randomly assigning vignettes that vary the level of state
commitment to R2P, differences in responses can be directly attributed
to the strength of the legal commitment, after holding constant the
level of norm internalization. However, it is unclear as to why a
stronger legal obligation is causing differences in responses. What
about strong legal commitments elicit increased public support for
compliance? Why does the public care about strong legal commitments
enough to support compliance? What are the causal mechanisms
through which strong legal commitments prompt public support for
compliance?
Theoretically, a stronger level of commitment to an
international norm could have encouraged compliance because
respondents feared the reputation costs of noncompliance. 100 Once
respondents were made aware of a strong state commitment to R2P,
they may have found it important to honor that commitment because
There is a long line of research on reputation costs motivating state
behavior. See, e.g., DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE
PRESERVATION OF PEACE (1996); JOSHUA D. KERTZER, RESOLVE IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2016); RICHARD LEBOW, WHY NATIONS FIGHT: PAST
AND FUTURE MOTIVES FOR WAR (2008); JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1996); MORROW, supra note 17; BARRY O’NEILL,
HONOR, SYMBOLS, AND WAR (1996); THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE
(1996); Allan Dafoe et al., Reputation and Status and Motives for War, 17 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 371 (2014); Paul Huth, Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical
Assessment, 7 SEC. STUD. 72 (1997); Shiping Tang, Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and
International Conflict, 14 SEC. STUD. 34 (2004); Alex Weisiger & Keren Yarhi-Milo,
Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics, 69 INT’L ORG. 473
(2015).
100
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they feared that inaction would create a reputation for noncompliance,
which could in turn cause other states to become more hesitant when
making future agreements with the U.S. The weak commitment
treatment, in contrast, may have been less likely to elicit the same
degree of reputational concerns.
In order to study why strong legal commitments were
generating greater public support for compliance than weak legal
commitments, the survey asked open-ended questions to all U.S.
respondents about why they chose to support or oppose compliance
with R2P.101 Using these responses, the study first cataloged common
words—referred to as “topics”—mentioned in the responses and
observed which topics appeared more or less frequently across
different treatment conditions.102
The study focused on several quantities of interest from text
analysis, which are summarized in the following two figures: one figure
that examines the mechanisms through which varying levels of legal
obligation had an effect when the norm was emerging and another figure
for when the norm was internalized. Each figure first reports the prevalence
of different topics (i.e., corpus proportions) in the two treatment
groups being compared, the low obligation treatment group and the
high obligation treatment group. Topics that represent a coherent

101
Due to the increased costs of conducting extended surveys necessary text
analyses, the study only fielded extended surveys of U.S. respondents.
102
More specifically, first the survey asked respondents to explain their
decision in a few sentences. Second, the responses were subset by each treatment
group. Next, using a structural topic model, the study uncovered common topics or
rationales that occurred in multiple responses and determined which treatment
conditions were more likely to trigger certain topics in the responses. Due to the
constraints of unsupervised machine learning, the number of topics had to be
specified beforehand. To minimize the possibility of researcher-induced bias in the
specification of the number of topics, the study used the “manyTopics” package in
R, which is a statistical software program used for text analysis. The program
processed multiple outputs from a structural topic model and selected the most
optimal run of the model in terms of exclusivity and semantic coherence. For a more
detailed description of the methodology, see generally Molly E. Roberts et al.,
Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1082 (2014).
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meaning are identified with a topic label in the figures below. Topics
that have little semantic meaning are left unlabeled.
Second, the figures each report the prevalence of certain topics
depending on treatment assignment. That is, each figure notes whether
high obligation is more likely to trigger a particular rationale to justify
the respondents’ stance than the low obligation treatment. Finally, the
figures depict sample responses from select topics to further illustrate
the causal mechanism a particular topic represented.
The figure below is text analysis of open-ended responses
provided by the low obligation treatment group and the high obligation
treatment group for an emerging norm. Topics 1, 3, and 4 did not have
a useful semantic meaning.103 Topic 2, on the other hand, described
the theorized reputation mechanism. As the top-right panel of the
figure shows, respondents in the high obligation treatment group were
more likely than the low obligation treatment group to mention
reputation as the reason for their stance.

103
Topic 4 may be of interest given its strong statistical significance. It
contained reasoning somewhat resembling isolationist sentiments. This sentiment
was likely felt across all respondents, but the high obligation treatment overrode such
sentiments while the low obligation treatment allowed such sentiments to be
expressed. Topic 4 was described as lacking a useful meaning in the text above for
clarity, especially since such sentiments were not a causal mechanism through which
the control treatment was having an effect but rather an expression of underlying
attitudes.
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Figure 4: Emerging Soft Law Treatment v. Emerging Hard Law Treatment

The next figure is text analysis of open-ended responses
provided by the low obligation treatment group and the high obligation
treatment group for an internalized norm. The results mirror the
results from the emerging norm treatment conditions. Again, as the
top-right panel of the figure shows, respondents in the high obligation
treatment group were more likely than the low obligation treatment
group to mention reputation as the reason for their stance.
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Figure 5: Internalized Soft Law Treatment v. Internalized Hard Law
Treatment

For the most part, text analysis suggests that reputational
concerns were driving greater support for compliance with R2P in the
high obligation treatment group compared to the low obligation
treatment group, regardless of norm internalization.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Does state commitment to an international human rights norm
shift public support for compliance with that norm? This question lies
at the foundation of several domestic compliance mechanisms.
Unfortunately, previous experimental studies on public opinion
towards international law have resulted in mixed findings.104 This study
incorporates the life cycle of norms to arrive at a more accurate
understanding of when and how state commitment to international
human rights norms, specifically R2P, elicits public support for
compliance. By leveraging surveys in the U.S. and South Korea, the
study finds that when R2P is framed as an internalized norm, a strong
level of commitment does not always lead to greater public demand
for compliance than a weak commitment. The fact that R2P is
internalized may preclude the additive effects of stronger international
legal commitments in eliciting public support for compliance.
However, when R2P is framed as an emerging norm, the level of legal
commitment is crucial in shifting public support. A strong legal
commitment to an emerging norm will elicit greater public support for
compliance than a weak legal commitment, and it will do so by raising
reputational concerns.
The study has several practical implications for the future of
R2P. First, the manner in which policymakers and norm entrepreneurs
present R2P and other human rights norms may have a profound
impact on how the public perceives the norm and whether constituents
are willing to support state compliance. Second, whether states make a
strong or weak legal commitment to R2P matters in shaping domestic
public opinion, especially if the public perceives R2P to be an emerging
norm. To elicit support from those who consider R2P to be emerging
rather than established, R2P proponents may benefit from convincing
their state to make a high level of commitment to the norm.

Compare Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights, supra note 3,
Kreps & Wallace, supra note 3, Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 3, Tomz, supra note
3, and Wallace, The Reputational Consequences, supra note 3, with Chilton, The Laws of
War, supra note 3, Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 3, and Wallace, International Law and
Public Attitudes, supra note 3.
104
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Third, there are cross-national differences that proponents of
R2P should be aware of. An American policymaker hoping to elicit
greater public support for compliance with R2P from segments of the
populace that already consider the norm to be internalized still benefits
from securing a stronger legal commitment relative to a weaker
commitment. However, this does not hold true for South Korean
policymakers whose constituents are not more likely to be moved by a
stronger state commitment to what they already perceive to be an
established norm. Given the cross-national differences, testing human
rights norms other than R2P and doing so in different regions to
uncover potential regional differences offer promising paths forward
for future scholars.
Finally, using text analysis, the study shows that stronger legal
commitments are effective in eliciting public support for compliance
because American respondents are more likely to believe that the
reputation of the state is at stake when a strong commitment has been
made to abide by R2P. On a broader methodological note for future
legal and public opinion scholars, this study makes evident the
promising potential of text analysis to enrich findings drawn from
public opinion surveys. Scholars should consider, despite the increased
costs, the benefits of including open-ended questions within their
surveys for similar analyses of causal mechanisms.
In closing, the demonstrated shifts in public support for
compliance with R2P seems to justify the scholarly emphasis placed on
legal obligation and domestic compliance mechanisms, but future
research on public opinion and human rights norms should take into
account the life cycle of the underlying norms and regional differences
when attempting to understand whether international legal
commitments will inspire public support for compliance.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY TEXT
[For U.S. respondents:]
According to reports by U.S. intelligence officers and independent
investigative reporters, we now have conclusive evidence that an
armed group is attacking civilians in several Southeast Asian countries.
This armed group has ties to radical separatists in Indonesia.
[Control treatment: No information]
[Hard law and internalized norm treatment:] The United States
previously signed an international treaty in which the U.S. made a
commitment to protect civilians from such attacks under a wellestablished idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According
to this well-established idea, the international community has a
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent
armed groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the
use of force.
[Hard law and emerging norm treatment:] The United States has
previously signed an international treaty in which the U.S. made a
commitment to protect civilians from such attacks under a new idea
called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea,
some claim that the international community has a responsibility to
take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed groups in
instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the use of force.
[Soft law and internalized norm treatment:] The United States
previously participated in a regional meeting that suggested general
guidelines to protect civilians from such attacks under a wellestablished idea called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According
to this well-established idea, the international community has a
responsibility to take measures to protect civilians and pursue violent
armed groups in instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the
use of force.
[Soft law and emerging norm treatment:]The United States previously
participated in a regional meeting that suggested general guidelines to
protect civilians from such attacks under a new idea called the
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this new idea, some
claim that the international community has a responsibility to take
measures to protect civilians and pursue violent armed groups in
instances of mass atrocities, measures that include the use of force.
Pursuing the armed group would result in U.S. military involvement in
Southeast Asia and pose another significant cost to the national
budget. Considering the circumstances, do you approve or disapprove
of the U.S. taking military measures to go after the armed group?
Strongly approve
Approve
Somewhat approve
Neither approve nor disapprove
Somewhat disapprove
Disapprove
Strongly disapprove
Please write a couple sentences to explain your opinion. Your opinion
is very important to us and we want to understand it.
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[For Korean respondents (in the original Korean):]
한국 정보기관의 정보와 독립적인 전문 기자들의 보도에
의하면, 동남아시아 몇 나라에서 한 무장단체가 민간인들을
공격하고 있다는 확실한 증거가 있다. 이 무장단체는
인도네시아의 급진적인 분리주의자들과 연계되어 있다.
[Control treatment: No commitment]
[Hard law and established norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 국제적으로 확고부동한
규범(관례)에 따라 한국은 민간인들을 보호하기 위해
공식적으로 법적인 책임진다는 구속력이 있는 국제적인
조약을 체결하였다. R2P(보호할 책임)는 대중(大衆)에 대한
잔혹행위와 인권침해를 막지 못하는 국가는 그 국가의 주권을
박탈당한다는 규범이다. R2P(보호할 책임)는 아주 오랫동안
국제관계의 초석이 되어 왔다. 국제적으로 확고부동한 이
규범에 따라, 폭력적인 무장단체의 대량 잔혹행위로부터
민간인을 보호하기 위하여 국제 사회는 무력을 포함한 여러
조치를 취할 책임을 갖는다. 우리 나라는 공개적으로 이것을
약속 했으므로, R2P(보호할 책임)를 법적으로 이행할 책임이
있다.
[Hard law and emerging norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 논란 중에 있는 새로운 개념에 따라
한국은 민간인들을 보호하기 위해 공식적으로 법적인
책임진다는 구속력이 있는 국제적인 조약을 체결하였다.
R2P(보호할 책임)라는 새로운 개념에 따라, 국제 사회는 대중에
대한 잔혹행위로부터 시민을 보호하고, 그런 폭력적인
무장단체를 소탕하기 위한 군사적 조치를 할 책임을 가지고
있다고 일부 사람들은 주장한다. 우리 나라는 공개적으로
이것을 약속 했으므로, R2P(보호할 책임)를 법적으로 이행할
책임이 있다.
[Soft law and established norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 국제적으로 확고부동한
규범(관례)에 따라 민간인들을 보호하기 위한 가이드라인을
제안한 동북아 국제 회의에 참석한 적이 있다. R2P(보호할
책임)는 대중(大衆)에 대한 잔혹행위와 인권침해를 막지 못하는
국가는 그 국가의 주권을 박탈당한다는 규범이다. R2P(보호할
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책임)는 아주 오랫동안 국제관계의 초석이 되어 왔다.
국제적으로 확고부동한 이 규범에 따라, 폭력적인 무장단체의
대량 잔혹행위로부터 민간인을 보호하기 위하여 국제 사회는
무력을 포함한 여러 조치를 취할 책임을 갖는다.
[Soft law and emerging norm treatment:] 우리 나라는 예전에
R2P(보호할 책임)라 불리는 논란 중에 있는 새로운 개념에 따라
민간인들을 보호하기 위한 가이드라인을 제안한 동북아 국제
회의에 참석한 적이 있다. R2P(보호할 책임)라는 새로운 개념에
따라, 국제 사회는 대중에 대한 잔혹행위로부터 시민을
보호하고, 그런 폭력적인 무장단체를 소탕하기 위한 군사적
조치를 할 책임을 가지고 있다고 일부 사람들은 주장한다.
무장단체를 쫓기 위해서는 동남아시아 지역에 우리 나라
군사력을 투입해야 하고, 그렇기 때문에 국가의 예산과 국군에
큰 부담이 된다. 이러한 여건을 감안한다면, 우리 나라가
무장단체를 소탕하기위해 군사적 조치를 취하는 것에
동의하십니까?
매우 동의
동의
다소 동의
모름
다소 반대
반대
매우 반대
당신의 의견은 저희에게 매우 중요합니다. 위의 선택을 하신
이유를 몇 문장으로 설명하시오.
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